Social collateral,dynamic incentives,and joint liability in a two‐step trust game: Lending to the unbankable

Asymmetric information and lack of collateral creates a suboptimal allocation of financial resources to those in most need. When uncollateralised borrowers approach financial institutions, the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection results in no lending. Conversely, group‐lending contracts—joint liability, dynamic lending, and social cost for defaulting—control for information asymmetries and create a co‐operative trust game between borrowers leading to an undominated optimal strategy to repay, and therefore, for the lender to Give. Group lending proves superior to typical individual borrowing and lending when no collateral is available. Social collateral and trust are fundamental pieces of the successful work of MicroFinance. Resulting contracts and correspondent payoffs are Pareto efficient.     

Minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups

We study minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups. We assume that agents are located in different villages, cities, etc. The groups are the agents of the same village. We introduce a rule for dividing the cost of connecting all agents to the source among the agents taking into account the group structure. We characterize this rule with several desirable properties. We prove that this rule coincides with the Owen value of the TU game associated with the irreducible matrix.     

Feedback effects of credit ratings

Rating agencies are often criticized for being biased in favor of borrowers, for being too slow to downgrade following credit quality deterioration, and for being oligopolists. Based on a model that takes into account the feedback effects of credit ratings, I show that: (i) rating agencies should focus not only on the accuracy of their ratings but also on the effects of their ratings on the probability of survival of the borrower; (ii) even when rating agencies pursue an accurate rating policy, multi-notch downgrades or immediate default may occur in response to small shocks to fundamentals; (iii) increased competition between rating agencies can lead to rating downgrades, increasing default frequency and reducing welfare.     

Productivity,real exchange rate,and aggregate demand: An empirical exercise applied to Brazil from 1960 to 2011

This research analyzes, from a post Kaleckian perspective, the interactions among the aggregate demand, the real exchange rate, productivity, and real wages in the Brazilian economy from 1960 to 2011. It adopts the longstanding perspective that demand is the driver of capital accumulation and economic growth. The research comprises the following steps: (a) a critical assessment of the growth regime literature, with a particular emphasis on issues related to productivity and the real exchange rate; (b) understanding the relationship between the real exchange rate and the productivity and growth regimes; (c) proposing a theoretical model that relates the real exchange rate, productivity, and the growth regime; and (d) an empirical test of the interaction between the real exchange rate, productivity, and the growth regime. Theoretically the study develops a model showing the interactions between the aggregate demand, the real exchange rate, productivity, and real wages. Furthermore, this research attempts to address the lack of theoretical and empirical studies about the relationship between the aggregate demand, the real exchange rate, productivity and real wages.     

Real Estate,Public Works,and Political Organization in Winnipeg, 1870–1885

The second half of the 19^th century represented an era of great territorial expansion in almost all the countries of “recent settlement.” In Canada, Winnipeg, the capital of the Province of Manitoba, went from a small hamlet located at the confluence of the Assiniboine and Red Rivers to become the third largest Canadian city at the turn of the century. I argue that the development of a real estate market and the organization of the local political institutions in Winnipeg were interconnected mechanisms that the emerging business elite used to obtain political and economic power during the years of city organization (1870–1885). The disputes over land ownership and the uncertain distribution of land titles among parties related by business and family ties showed how individuals exploited the weakness of the state to secure personal benefits. In this era, old settlers, newcomers, speculators, and business representatives of central Canada and British firms, acting alone or in partnership, attempted to obtain political control of a city in its making and to acquire power and economic benefits through the commodification of urban land. After a period of corruption and mismanagement, a new group organized within the Board of Trade obtained political control of the city and initiated a new cycle of political stability.     

Independent boards and innovation

Much research has suggested that independent boards of directors are more effective in reducing agency costs and improving firm governance. How they influence innovation is less clear. Relying on regulatory changes, we show that firms that transition to independent boards focus on more crowded and familiar areas of technology. They patent and claim more and receive more total future citations to their patents. However, the citation increase comes mainly from incremental patents in the middle of the citation distribution; the numbers of uncited and highly cited patents—arguably associated with riskier innovation strategies—do not change significantly.     

Linkages between the farm and nonfarm sectors at the household level in rural Ghana: a consistent stochastic distance function approach

This article explores the effects within households of an expanding rural nonfarm (RNF) sector in Ghana. We ask whether the growing RNF sector allows for economies of diversification within farms, how it affects household input demands, and whether it has measurable effects in overall household production efficiency. We explore the intrahousehold linkages between agricultural and RNF activities, first assuming perfectly competitive input and output markets and then with market failures, in particular missing labor and credit markets. We then measure these linkages using a household level input distance function, finding high levels of inefficiency in Ghanaian farms. Also, there are cost-complementarities between the RNF sector and the agricultural sector, particularly with food crops in which the poorest tend to specialize. The expansion of the RNF sector increases demand for most inputs including agricultural land. Finally, we show that smaller farms tend to be more efficient, and that RNF output is helping the farm household to become more efficient, but the latter result is not robust.     

Dynamic Spatial Competition Between Multi‐Store Retailers

We propose a dynamic model of an oligopoly industry characterized by spatial competition between multi‐store retailers. Firms compete in prices and decide where to open or close stores depending on demand and cost conditions, the number of competitors at different locations, and on location‐specific private‐information shocks. The model distinguishes multiple forces in the spatial configuration of store networks, such as cannibalization of revenue between stores of the same retail chain, economies of density, competition, consumer transportation costs, or positive demand spillovers from other stores. We develop an algorithm to approximate a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in our model, and propose a procedure for the estimation of the parameters of the model using panel data on number of stores, prices, and quantities at multiple geographic locations within a city. We also present a numerical example to illustrate the model and algorithm.